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ABSTRACT
Vehicular Networks (VNs) seek to provide, among other ap-
plications, safer driving conditions. To do so, vehicles need
to periodically broadcast safety messages providing precise
position information to nearby vehicles. However, this fre-
quent messaging (e.g., every 100 to 300ms per car) greatly
facilitates the tracking of vehicles, as it suffices to eavesdrop
the wireless medium. As a result, the drivers privacy is at
stake. In order to mitigate this threat, while complying with
the safety requirements of VNs, we suggest the creation of
mix-zones at appropriate places of the VN. We propose to
do so with the use of cryptography, and study analytically
how the combination of mix-zones into mix-networks brings
forth location privacy in VNs. Finally, we show by simu-
lations that the proposed mix system is effective in various
scenarios.
1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Networks (VNs) consist of vehicles and Road-
Side Units (RSUs) equipped with radios. Using Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nications, vehicles share safety-related information and ac-
cess location-based services. Initiatives in Europe [6] and
the US [8] are evaluating VNs promises of safer driving
conditions and more efficient traffic management. Envi-
sioned safety-related applications require the vehicles to pe-
riodically broadcast their current position, speed and accel-
eration in authenticated safety messages. This messaging
increases the awareness of vehicles about their neighbors’
whereabouts and warns drivers off dangerous situations.
The nature of the wireless communications makes eaves-
dropping particularly easy. All an adversary needs to do
is to deploy its devices across the area of the network that
it wishes to monitor. At the same time, safety messages
provide rich information on their senders, for example, the
vehicle’s location. This essentially allows automatic track-
ing of the vehicle whereabouts. Thus, it can reveal private
information regarding the activities of the driver. The wide
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availability of VN-compatible radios (802.11-based) makes
such a threat even more credible.
The use of randomly changing identifiers (i.e., pseudonyms)
has been proposed to decorrelate the identity of vehicles
from their locations. The purpose of such a scheme is to
achieve unlinkability between the vehicle and its pseudonyms
in the long run. However, updating the pseudonym of a vehi-
cle in a monitored region is ineffective, because the location
information of safety messages can still be used for tracking.
Therefore, changing pseudonyms is effective only within re-
gions in which monitoring is impossible.
In this paper, we address the problem of achieving loca-
tion privacy in VNs with randomly changing identifiers in
the presence of a global passive adversary. We are fully
aware of the need for strong security in VNs, along with
privacy protection [23, 19, 22, 20, 18, 4]. In particular, in
this context, pseudonyms are anonymized public keys. Our
proposal fits in this framework of pseudonymous authenti-
cation. Our contribution is threefold. First, we propose a
protocol to create cryptographic mix-zones at road inter-
sections. This solution thwarts computationally-bounded
eavesdroppers while preserving the functionality of safety
messages. Second, we analyze the location privacy achieved
by combining mix-zones into mix-networks in VNs. These
so-called vehicular mix-networks leverage on the mobility of
vehicles and the dynamics of road intersections to mix vehi-
cle identifiers. Finally, we show by means of simulations the
effectiveness of the proposed mix system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we present the VN system model and privacy-
related adversary model. In Section 3, we introduce the
CMIX protocol. In Section 4, we establish an analytical
model of the amount of location privacy achievable in VNs
with mix-zones. In Section 5, we evaluate the effectiveness of
vehicular mix-networks by means of simulations. In Section
6, we discuss the global passive internal adversary threat
model and alternative CMIX protocol designs. In Section 7,
we present previous contributions on location privacy in mo-
bile networks. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we briefly introduce VNs and describe the
threat model we consider throughout the paper.
2.1 Vehicular Networks
Vehicular Networks (VNs) consist of vehicles, Road-Side
Units (RSUs) and a collection of backbone servers accessible
via the RSUs. We assume that a single VN Operator (VNO)
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Figure 1: Vehicular Networks. Safety messages are
emitted periodically (typically, every 100 ms to 300
ms) [8]. The Certification Authority (CA) is acces-
sible through the RSUs. pi, si and ai are the vehicle
i position, speed, and acceleration.
is responsible for deploying RSUs in the network. Due to
their relevance to life-critical applications, VNs have to sat-
isfy several strict requirements, namely sender and data au-
thenticity, availability, liability, and real-time delivery. VNs
are a very challenging application of ad-hoc networks as all
the above prerequisites must be achieved under the stringent
conditions created by a highly dynamic mobile environment.
To prevent accidents and inform each other of dangerous
situations, vehicles periodically broadcast safety messages
indicating their position, speed, acceleration, and possibly
many other types of information (Fig. 1). We assume that
each vehicle is equipped with a GPS device that provides ac-
curate location information within an acceptable error mar-
gin.
Similarly to the work in [23, 19, 22, 18], we assume that
a suitable public key infrastructure is available in VNs and
that the messages are properly signed to ensure the liability
of their sender in case of an accident. A certificate is at-
tached to each message to enable other vehicles to verify the
sender’s authenticity. Vehicles are equipped with Tamper-
Proof Devices (TPDs) that guarantee the correct execution
of cryptographic operations and the non-disclosure of pri-
vate keying material. TPDs come with their own battery
and clock. Prior to entering the network, each vehicle i
has to register with a Certification Authority (CA) and
preloads a large set of pseudonyms Pi,k, with k = 1, ..., F ,
where F is the size of the pseudonym set. The CAs are
fully trusted third parties and interoperable entities, oper-
ated by governmental organizations, that conform to pri-
vacy policies and keep the relation of the pseudonyms to the
driver’s real identity secret. In case of liability issues, this
relation can be made public by law enforcement. For each
pseudonym Pi,k the corresponding CA generates a unique
public/private key pair (Ki,k,K
−1
i,k ) and a corresponding cer-
tificate Certi,k(Ki,k).
1 Each vehicle sequentially updates its
pseudonym at regular time intervals independently of other
vehicles. Pseudonyms have a short validity period and can-
not be reused.
2.2 Threat Model
VNs significantly facilitate the tracking of vehicles. In
fact, the cost of tracking vehicles by radio eavesdroppers
1The pseudonym can be the public key itself
is reduced compared to that of tracking vehicles with cam-
eras. Similarly, the tracking efficiency is increased because
an eavesdropper obtains identifiers, location and other in-
formation from safety messages.2 Hence, the tracking gran-
ularity is high. Moreover, unlike mobile phones and laptop
wireless adapters, vehicle transceivers cannot be switched
off [20]. Consequently, vehicles’ whereabouts can be moni-
tored at all times. This can provide significant information
about their drivers’ activities, and can be exploited for tar-
geted advertisement or surveillance. For example, an adver-
sary can deduce from mobility traces the home and work
place of a driver, and hence his real world identity [16].
The adversary is either internal or external, that is, uti-
lizes devices that are legitimate members of the VN [23, 18],
or any other radio transceiver [19]. In this paper, we are con-
cerned with achieving location privacy against an external
adversary.
An external adversary installs its own radio receivers near
the road network and passively eavesdrops vehicle safety
messages. Outside the range of its radio receivers, the ad-
versary cannot overhear transmissions. Thus, its strength
depends on the number of its eavesdropping devices. A
global adversary has a complete view of the monitored net-
work. Such an adversary can be put in place by exploiting
already deployed 802.11 networks. For example, wireless so-
cial communities (e.g., FON [10]), or WiFi operators (e.g.,
Google) provide low cost wireless internet connectivity via
WiFi networks in cities. With minor software or hardware
modifications, this infrastructure can eavesdrop VN commu-
nications.
On the other hand, setting up a network of internal eaves-
droppers would be much harder. The adversary would need
to obtain legitimate devices, e.g., vehicles equipped with
transceivers. The use of a TPD prevents adversaries from
compromising cryptographic material. However, the VNO,
which is a partially trusted third party, could be enticed
to passively monitor the position of vehicles. We do not
consider this type of adversary. We assume instead in this
paper that the VNO assists in setting up privacy protection
mechanisms.
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MIX-ZONES IN VE-
HICULAR NETWORKS
Anonymous systems, as described by Chaum [5], aim at
increasing the adversary’s workload to uniquely identify the
author of an action. In this section, we present a crypto-
graphic technique to create anonymizing regions, that is,
mix-zones [2] in VNs. The idea for mix-zones is to prevent
the adversary from accessing the content of (safety) mes-
sages, including the vehicle’s signatures that are trivially
linkable to the corresponding pseudonym, and thus be un-
able to connect two pseudonyms successively used by the
same vehicle.
The effectiveness of anonymizing regions in providing lo-
cation privacy depends on the density of vehicles and the
unpredictability of their whereabouts. We propose to create
mix-zones at predetermined locations and to force pseudonym
changes to take place within those regions. Because the
highest mixing of vehicles occurs at road intersections where
2We do not consider the monitoring of other type of vehicu-
lar communications (e.g., infotainement) that do not contain
precise location information.
the speed and direction of vehicles change the most (i.e.,
it is an appropriate mix context [11]), we propose placing
mix-zones at road intersections. We assume that all vehi-
cles participate in the anonymization process at every road
intersection.
3.1 The CMIX Protocol
Since the location of mix-zones is fixed, the adversary can
identify them and thus could easily attempt to eavesdrop
transmissions originating in the mix-zone area. To solve this
problem, we introduce the CMIX Protocol to create Crypto-
graphic MIX-zones (CMIXes): all legitimate vehicles within
the mix-zone obtain a symmetric key from the road-side unit
(RSU) of the mix-zone, and utilize this key to encrypt all
their messages while within the zone. The symmetric key is
obtained through a key establishment phase. To ensure the
functionality of safety messages, this mix-zone key can be
obtained by nodes approaching the mix-zone with the help
of a key forwarding mechanism, and, finally, the RSU can
swap to a new key through a key update mechanism.
3.1.1 CMIX Key Establishment
Vehicles rely on the presence of RSUs at road intersections
to initiate a Key Establishment mechanism and establish a
symmetric key. RSUs advertise their presence by periodi-
vi → RSU: Request, Ts, Signi(Request, Ts), Certi,k
RSU → vi: EKi,k (vi, SK, Ts, SignRSU (vi, SK, Ts)), CertRSU
vi → RSU: Ack, Ts, Signi(Ack, Ts), Certi,k
Table 1: The Key Establishment protocol. Ts is a
time stamp, Sign()˙ is the signature of the message,
Cert is the certificate of the message sender.
cally broadcasting beacons. As soon as a vehicle vi enters
in the of transmission range of an RSU, RBeacon, it initiates
the key establishment protocol described in Table 1. As
the vehicle knows its own location and the location of the
RSU (announced in the beacon), it can estimate whether
it is within the mix-zone, defined by a transmission range
RCMIX < RBeacon. If so, the vehicle vi broadcasts one
or, if needed, several key request messages (first message in
Table 1). The RSU replies with the symmetric key SK en-
crypted with the public key of vehicle vi and a signature.
vi receives and decrypts the message. If the message is val-
idated, vi acknowledges it and SK can be used to encrypt
all subsequent safety messages until vi leaves the mix-zone.
In case RSUs are co-located (i.e., their mix-zones overlap),
vehicles are aware of all CMIX keys so that they can decrypt
all messages. Alternatively, co-located RSUs could coordi-
nate to use the same CMIX key.
3.1.2 Key Forwarding
Vehicles in the extended mix-zone, that is, at a distance
d from the RSU where RCMIX < d < RBeacon may be un-
able to obtain directly the key from the RSU; for example,
they are beyond their transceiver’s range for bidirectional
communication. Thus, they cannot decrypt safety messages
coming out of the CMIX. As vehicles know they are within
an RSU transmission range, when they receive encrypted
safety messages, they issue one or, if needed, several key re-
quests to obtain the SK key with the help of vehicles already
in the mix-zone which are aware of it.
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Figure 2: Extended Mix-zones. (1) v1 uses the Key
Establishment to learn the symmetric key. (2) v2
uses the Key Forwarding protocol.
Consider the example of Figure 2: vehicle v1 already knows
the CMIX key and can forward it to v2. Hence, the RSU
leverages on the vehicles in the mix-zone. In our example,
when v2 enters the extended mix-zone, as soon as it receives
an encrypted (intelligible) message, it initiates the broadcast
of one or, if needed, several key requests. v1 eventually re-
ceives a key request from v2, and forwards it the symmetric
key:
EK2,k (v2, v1, SK, Ts, SignRSU (v1, SK, Ts))
The signature from the RSU, along with the time stamp,
allows to validate the transmitted symmetric key. Note that
vehicles in the extended region do not encrypt their safety
messages with the CMIX key before entering the mix-zone
(RCMIX). The entire above message is in addition signed
by v1.
3.1.3 Key Update
We propose a Key Update mechanism to renew or revoke
CMIX symmetric keys. The RSU is responsible for such key
updates and determines when to initiate the process. Key
updates occur only when the mix-zone is empty and vehicles
obtain new keys via the key transport and key forward proto-
cols. The CA obtains the new symmetric key from the RSU
over a secure channel, to satisfy the liability requirements
(i.e., possibly, decrypt safety messages in the future). The
robustness provided by the system is increased, if key up-
dates are asynchronous across different base stations. But
there is a trade off between security and cost, as frequent
updates can incur additional overhead.
3.2 Analysis of the CMIX Protocol
The CMIX protocol requires the exchange of two mes-
sages. One or several key request messages are sent until
either an RSU or a vehicle receive it. Such transmission
overhead can be kept low: in a dense traffic scenario, one
key request should suffice before receiving a reply, whereas
in a low-density scenario the message overhead has low im-
pact. When a key request is broadcasted, potentially every
vehicle in the transmission range could send back a key re-
ply. To avoid such reply flooding, a number of mechanisms
can be used (e.g., random backoff mechanism); we will eval-
uate those in future work. Upon receipt of the mix-zone key,
the vehicle sending the key request acknowledges the acqui-
sition of the key, to prevent additional neighboring vehicles
from forwarding again the key. Cryptographic overhead can
also be easily sustained with relatively low delay [21].
In terms of security, the adversary is computationally bounded
and unable to launch brute-force cryptanalytic attacks on
the mix-zone encrypted messages. Because messages are au-
thenticated, an external adversary cannot impersonate ve-
hicles, and replay attacks would not be successful neither
thanks to time stamps. Similarly, the adversary cannot forge
RSU messages or impersonate an RSU; as a result, cannot
create fictitious mix-zones with symmetric keys it controls.
By appending the node identifier to the key reply, an ad-
versary is prevented from executing several instantiations of
the key establishment protocol in parallel.
To impede the proper unfolding of the protocol, an exter-
nal adversary can attempt to selectively jam messages from
the RSU containing the symmetric key and force vehicles
into transmitting their safety messages in clear. Still, the
key forward protocol can increase the resilience. However,
jamming is largely orthogonal to our problem. If nodes (de-
tect they) are jammed, communication is impossible in the
first place. In case of being unable to obtain the CMIX key
because of denial of service, vehicles can always revert to
regular operation, ignoring the mix-zone.
Furthermore, an internal adversary could simply purchase
as many vehicles as the number of intersections it wishes to
monitor. Then, every time a new update takes place, it
would legitimately obtain from the RSU all mix-zone keys.
Protection against such high-cost adversaries (recall: the
TPD protects from illegitimate extraction of credentials and
keys from the vehicle, and purchasing vehicles is costly) is
part of future work.
Finally, an adversary can monitor vehicles entering and
exiting the CMIX and compute the most probable mappings
of events. We evaluate in the next section the amount of in-
formation this kind of adversary can gather. We show that
the construction of mix-zones into mix-networks in VNs in-
creases the robustness of the system against privacy degra-
dation attacks by accumulating the anonymity over several
mix-zones.
4. LOCATION PRIVACY OF VEHICULAR
MIX-NETWORKS
In the context of VNs, the CMIX protocol creates mix-
zones at road intersections. By connecting various mix-
zones, we accumulate the anonymity achieved by each mix-
zone and obtain a larger system referred to as a mix-network.
Inspired by existing works on mix-zones, we derive an ana-
lytical model of the location privacy achieved by vehicular
mix-networks.
We begin our analysis by developing a metric for loca-
tion privacy in mix-zones and modeling two types of adver-
sary: (i) a weak adversary and (ii) a strong adversary. The
strength of the adversary depends on the information avail-
able to it. Then, we show that the mobility of vehicles and
the physical properties of intersections affect the achievable
unlinkability.
4.1 Vehicular Mix-Zones
A mix-zone is an anonymizing region that obfuscates the
relation between entering and exiting vehicles. The adver-
sary observes the timing and the location of the entering and
exiting vehicles in order to derive a probability distribution
over the possible mappings. In VNs, because we assume
that mix-zones are located at road intersections, the timing
of events depends on the delay characteristics of the intersec-
tion structure. Likewise, the location of entering and exiting
vehicles depends on their trajectory in an intersection.
Beresford introduces a framework in [2] for the analysis
of mix-zones, which was later adapted to VNs by Buttyan
et al. in [3]. The event k of a vehicle entering the mix-
zone at time τ on road n is denoted by k = (n, τ); similarly,
the event l of a vehicle exiting the mix-zone at time τ ′ on
road e is denoted by l = (e, τ ′). pn,e is the probability of
exiting at e knowing that the vehicle entered at n. qn,e(t) is
the probability that the time needed to enter at n and exit
at e is equal to t. In a simple example with two vehicles,
pk→l = pn,eqn,e(t) is the probability of the mapping of an
entry event k to an exit event l. For m vehicles, we use
the derivation by Beresford in [1]. The location privacy of a
vehicle corresponding to event l is the entropy of pk→l ([25])
H(l) = −
N∑
k=1
pk→l log2 (pk→l) (1)
The entropy increases with two factors: (i) the number N of
vehicles in the mix-zone and (ii) the similarity of the distri-
bution of pk→l to the uniform distribution. The precision of
the probability distributions of pn,e and qn,e(t) relies on the
information available to the adversary and is thus closely
related to the threat model.
4.1.1 Weak Adversary
The Weak Adversary (WA) is aware of the set of vehicles
entering/exiting the mix-zone but not of their timing and
trajectories, e.g., an external passive adversary with a lim-
ited view of an intersection. Thus, to the adversary, vehicles
spend a constant time C within a mix-zone, i.e., qn,e(t) = C.
Similarly, the trajectory of vehicles in intersections cannot
be evaluated and pn,e = C. Hence, pk→l is a uniform dis-
tribution and the upperbound on the achievable location
privacy is
H(l) ≤ log2(N) (2)
The maximum location privacy depends exclusively on the
number N of vehicles in the mix-zone. The weak adversary
provides an upperbound to the achievable unlinkability.
4.1.2 Strong Adversary
The Strong Adversary (SA) captures the sequentiality and
location of events by gathering entering/exiting times and
positions of vehicles. Hence, the effectiveness of a mix-zone
relies on the delay characteristics of the intersection and
on the trajectory of the vehicles in the road network. We
assume that in a time interval Γ, N vehicles arrive at the
mix-zone where N is determined by a Poisson distribution
with parameter ρ. Hence, vehicles’ arrival times τi for i =
1...N are distributed according to a uniform distribution,
τi ∼ U(Γ).
Delay characteristics of VNs depend on the road intersec-
tion. The SA models road intersections with normal distri-
butions. The delay is modeled by a normal distribution that
depends on the trajectory of the vehicle in the intersection.
For example, if d is the number of road segments that meet
at an intersection, and we have d = 4; for vehicles arriving
from n1, their delay characteristics is
qn1,ei(t) ∼ N (µ1,i, σ1,i) (3)
where i = 1...d and e1, e2, e3 and e4 indicate (with respect
to n1) the directions u-turn, left, straight and right, respec-
tively. By varying µ and σ, the SA models various types
of intersections. We assume that a strong attacker has an
a-priori knowledge about the intersections (such as the inter-
section structure) to compute the delay parameters (µ, σ).
The adversary models the trajectory of vehicles by choos-
ing pn,e < 1 according to an a-priori knowledge of the road
topology and intersection types such that
∑d
e=1 Pn,e = 1
for every entering point n. For example, if Pn,e takes a uni-
form distribution, then vehicles move according to a random
walk.
4.2 Vehicular Mix-Networks
Typically, several mixes are used in chain to accumulate
the unlinkability provided by each mix-zone. By connecting
various independent mix-zones, we obtain a larger system
that we call a vehicular mix-network. We approximate the
location privacy of a vehicle v traversing a vehicular mix-
network composed of L mix-zones as
Htot(v, L) =
L∑
i=1
Hi(v) (4)
where Hi is the location privacy gathered at each mix-zone.
The vehicular network environment affects the efficiency of
vehicular mix-networks in three aspects.
First, each mix-zone has its proper delay characteristics.
In other words, the delay characteristics are very dependent
on the intersection type. Hence, some intersections might
provide very good anonymity while in others, vehicles will be
easily traceable. The total unlinkability achieved by vehicle
v then depends on the set Sv ⊂ S and on the number Lv =
|Sv| of traversed mix-zones.
Second, the sparsely connected topology of VNs might
facilitate the analysis of the network by the adversary by
reducing the number of possible mappings. Yet, Danezis
shows in [7] that sparsely connected mix-networks achieve
the same anonymity as fully-connected mix-networks after
O(log|S|) steps, where S is the set of all mix-zones. In
other words, when L is in the order of log|S|, vehicular mix-
networks achieve the same performance as fully connected
networks. For example, in a vehicular mix-network with
10000 CMIXes, a vehicle must go through 4 intersections.
Third, the density of vehicles per mix-zone (intersection)
changes over time and it decreases the average achievable
anonymity per mix-zone. Indeed, the anonymity achieved
with a fixed number of vehicles per mix-zone is higher than
the anonymity achieved with a varying number of vehicles.
Using Jensen’s inequality with a concave function and (2),
we have
E[log2(N)] ≤ log2(E[N ]) (5)
Hence, density diversity in mix-zones decreases the achiev-
able unlinkability. For these reasons, vehicular mix-networks
are highly dynamic.
5. SIMULATIONS
We simulate a simple vehicular mix-network and evalu-
ate the achievable location privacy under various network
conditions.
5.1 Setup
The VN is modeled in Matlab as a 10 × 10 Manhattan
network with d = 4, where d is the number of road segments
that meet at each intersection. We assume M vehicles in
the network and an average number of vehicles per inter-
section ρ = M
10·10 . Each intersection is modeled by three
parameters: (1) vehicle trajectories pn,e, (2) vehicle arrival
times Γ and (3) vehicle delays (µ, σ). Vehicles move at each
time step between adjacent intersections according to pn,e.
Pn,n, the probability of a u-turn, is set to 0 for every road
direction. A pn,e vector is randomly defined for each in-
tersection in the network. The vehicles’ arrival times are
uniformly distributed between 0 and Γ seconds. When Γ
is small, vehicles enter the mix-zone almost simultaneously.
This models a highly congested traffic. In a low congestion
traffic scenario, Γ is large, and vehicle arrival times are easily
distinguishable. Each intersection delay characteristics are
modeled by randomly choosing parameters (µ, σ). We as-
sume that the adversary knows the system parameters and
has therefore a perfect a-priori knowledge.
All results are the average of 20 simulations of the Man-
hattan network and are presented with 95% confidence in-
tervals. We compute the achievable location privacy in the
presence of a weak and strong adversary, as defined in the
previous section.
5.2 Results
Figure 3(a) presents the average location privacy obtained
in an intersection for various vehicle densities. We show that
the achieved location privacy varies with respect to the traf-
fic congestion and the vehicle density. We observe that the
less congested the traffic is, and the easier it is for the ad-
versary to track vehicles based on their delay characteristics.
The upperbound is the average of Equation 2 over the num-
ber of user per intersection in the simulation. Figure 3(b)
presents the success probability of an adversary in tracking
vehicles. The adversary success probability is the ratio of the
number of successfully mapped vehicles to the total number
of vehicles in a mix-zone, averaged over all mix-zones. As ex-
pected, the success ratio decreases as the entropy increases.
Even with a high ρ and congested traffic, the adversary suc-
cess ratio is relatively high. We show next that the combi-
nation of mix-zones into mix-networks significantly reduces
this success ratio.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the same metrics as before
(entropy and adversary success ratio) in the case of a mix-
network. As expected (Equation 4), the accumulation of
anonymity over mix-zones increases almost linearly and the
adversary success ratio in tracking vehicles correctly from
source to destination becomes negligible. The achieved lo-
cation privacy varies linearly in the number of bits, but expo-
nentially in the number of vehicles. For example, a vehicle
that traverses 10 mix-zones gathers on average 20 bits of
anonymity (i.e., is indistinguishable among 220 vehicles).
6. DISCUSSION
Information that links messages to the same vehicle can
be obtained not only from the safety messages but also from
other sources. At the physical layer, vehicles might be iden-
tifiable by fingerprinting their transceivers [9]; however, to
the best of our knowledge, this has not been shown on VN
radios, while in different contexts, successful identification
was achieved but only with some significant probability. At
the data link and network layers, using the same MAC ad-
dress would render messages linkable. Thus, the proposed
solution is to randomly change the MAC and network (IP,
where applicable) address. Different aspects and methods
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Figure 3: Vehicular Mix-zone simulation results. (a)
Location privacy for various vehicle densities. (b)
Adversary success probability.
for data link and network layer address changes, with re-
spect to the pseudonym changes, are identified in [18].
A VNO could use the deployed RSUs and act as a global,
or more precisely within its area of coverage, internal ad-
versary. Essentially, the VNO monitors the points in the
network (intersections) that can provide valuable informa-
tion to track vehicles. Buttyan et al. show that changing
pseudonym in mix-zones between RSUs does not suffice to
obtain location privacy [3] when an adversary monitors more
than 50% of the intersections of the road network. Note also
that location information in safety messages is very precise
and facilitates tracking. Considering if an alternative way
to ensure accident avoidance can be devised, as well as a
form of private positioning that preserves the functionality
of safety messages but achieves location privacy, are inter-
esting directions of future work.
The efficiency of vehicular mix-networks is independent of
the underlying CMIX protocol. Hence, several alternative
CMIX protocols can be envisioned. The simplest CMIX
protocol preloads one unique symmetric key in all vehicles
throughout the network and the key is protected from ex-
ternal adversaries by the TPD. The robustness of such a
protocol is very low, as the single key can be compromised.
Instead of preloading one key, or letting the RSU decide
which keys to use, an alternative solution is to let vehicles
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Figure 4: Vehicular Mix-network simulation results
with ρ = 5. (a) Location privacy for various vehicle
densities. (b) Adversary success probability.
construct the symmetric key using group key agreement pro-
tocols. Each vehicle contributes its own secret to create the
symmetric key. However, the rapid inclusion and exclusion
of members would be hard. Furthermore, a protocol exploit-
ing the network topology and vehicle mobility could poten-
tially reduce the complexity of key establishment. In par-
ticular, a protocol using exclusively symmetric operations
to create cryptographic mix-zones would be an attractive
approach.
7. RELATED WORK
In order to achieve location privacy in a pervasive comput-
ing environment, Beresford and Stajano propose in [2] the
concept of mix-zones where a natural mixing of mobile nodes
occurs. Mix-zones are anonymized regions of the network
wherein mobile nodes change their identifiers to obfuscate
the relation between entering and exiting events. Numer-
ous proposals have since followed to allow for the creation of
mix-zones, improve their mixing performances or to measure
their effectiveness.
Huang et al. [14] suggest using random silent periods wherein
mobile nodes turn off their transceivers and update their
identifiers. In [15], they further propose arranging silent
periods into cascades and to enhance anonymity, coordinat-
ing silent periods. Gruteser and Gru¨nwald propose in [12]
a network-centric solution in that direction. In [17], Li et
al. suggest a user-centric solution letting mobile nodes co-
ordinate their silent periods and decide whether to change
pseudonyms. In [24], Sampigethaya et al. introduce CARA-
VAN, a VN location privacy scheme also based on silent
periods. In a different direction, Hoh and Gruteser [13]
present a path perturbation algorithm: nodes tamper with
the broadcasted location data to reduce the spatial and/or
temporal granularity of location information. This does not
apply to VNs, because it would jeopardize vehicular safety
applications. Finally, Buttya´n et al. assume in [3] that ve-
hicles exploit the separation of RSUs to mimic silent zones
and create anonymizing regions. Their analysis shows that
the effectiveness of this approach is limited as an adversary
monitoring 50% of the intersections can successfully track
60% of the vehicles with very high probability because of
the non-uniformity of the traffic.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of providing location
privacy in vehicular networks. We introduce the CMIX pro-
tocol to create cryptographic mix-zones at road intersections
wherein vehicles can change their pseudonyms. The com-
bination of mix-zones into vehicular mix-networks permits
the accumulation of unlinkability over the VN. Vehicular
mix-networks rely on the mobility of vehicles to provide lo-
cation privacy without jeopardizing the efficiency of safety
messages. We model analytically and evaluate by means
of simulations the unlinkability provided by vehicular mix-
networks. Our results show that, although the unlinkability
of individual mix-zones can be relatively low in some cases,
the accumulated unlinkability of the mix-networks is gener-
ally very high.
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